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Abstract 
 
The welfare impact of the 2001 income tax reform is assessed across dual-earner families with 
different characteristics.  A household labor supply model is estimated to account for variable 
behavioral responses by family type.  It was found that while higher education families received 
a larger share of the welfare gain generated from lower marginal tax rates, it was the lower 
education families that provided the bulk of the additional labor supply motivated by the tax 
reform.  Differing welfare gains across families with different numbers of children were also 
found, highlighting the importance of allowing responses to vary across family characteristics 
when assessing the welfare impact of a policy change. 
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 Assessing the Welfare Impact of the 2001 Tax Reform on Dual-earner Families 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 The purpose of this paper is to estimate differences in family labor supply decisions 
across different dual earner family types.  Thorough assessment of the impact of policy on 
behavior, thus the impact of policy on the economy, requires that we have an accurate 
understanding of how a policy change affects behavior and how behavior varies across families.  
This is especially true when the impact of the policy depends on characteristics of a family.1  
The analysis in this paper estimates utility function parameters in the context of a neoclassical 
joint utility framework to assess the impact of the 2001 tax reform on families distinguished by
the educational level of the husband and by number of children in the family.  The focus of t
analysis is on the impact of the tax reform on the labor supply decisions and welfare of dual-
earner families only.  The analysis illustrates that accounting for differences in preferences and 
behavioral responses across family characteristics is necessary to obtain a thorough 
understanding of the distributional impact of a policy change on family welfare. 
 
he 
                                                
 
 II. Background 
 In June 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (2001 tax 
reform) was the first major tax reform since the Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997.  The primary 
features of the 2001 tax reform were the reductions in the highest income tax brackets (from 28, 
31, 36 and 39.6 percent to 23, 28, 33, and 36 percent, respectively); a new lowest tax bracket of 
10 percent (the former lowest bracket was 15 percent); expansion of the child credit and the 
 
1 Hotchkiss and Moore (2002) show that even for a policy that is expected to have uniformly 
positive economic impact, the implications for family welfare can vary across income groups. 
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 Earned Income Tax Credit.  There were other changes that affected the Alternative Minimum 
tax, personal exemptions, and itemized deductions.2  All in all, the change in the tax code was 
extremely complicated and spawned a host of analyses that investigated the practical significance 
of the changes on family net income across the income distribution (for example see Gale and 
Potter 2002, Citizens for Tax Justice 2002, Johnson et al. 2006).   
 The conclusions of those analyses differ based on which side of the political spectrum the 
investigator resided.  While differing in their conclusions, the one thing all of these assessments 
have in common is that they exclusively look at the impact on income and/or consumption, not 
accounting for any potential changes in labor supply behavior.3  A unique contribution of this 
paper is that it allows for changes in labor supply decisions that might result from changes in the 
net wage family members expect to earn as a result of the tax reform.  Taking these behavioral 
changes into account, the impact of the tax reform on family welfare can be assessed and 
compared across families with different characteristics. 
 
III. Methodology 
 The goal of this paper is to quantify changes in family welfare, rather than account 
specifically for how decisions are made within the family.  Therefore, we model family labor 
supply decisions in a neoclassical joint utility framework.  This model can be thought of as a 
reduced-form specification of family decision making.  The model yields a clean-cut expression 
of family welfare that allows for cross wage effects on each member's labor supply decision.  
                                                 
2 The 2001 tax reform was followed closely by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 which had the effect of accelerating some of the 2001 provisions and reducing 
capital gains taxes even more.  The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 accelerated the full 
phase-in of the child tax credit. 
3 Auerbach (2002) explores the savings behavior implications and feedback impact of the 2001 
tax reform. 
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 Bargaining models do not reveal parameter values for a family utility function because the family 
is not the unit of analysis (rather each spouse in the family is).4  In addition, there is some 
evidence that the choice of structure for household decision making has very little implication for 
conclusions regarding labor supply responses or impact on welfare of tax policy changes (see 
Bargain and Moreau 2003). 
 Within the framework of the neoclassical family labor supply model, a family maximizes 
a utility function that is a function of the husband's leisure, the wife's leisure, and their joint 
consumption, subject to a single budget constraint: 
 1 2
1 2( , , )
1 1 2 2
 ( , ,
subject to 
L L C
)Max U U T h T h C
X w h w h Y
= − −
= + +
 (1) 
T is total time available for an individual, 1L T h1= −  is the husband's leisure, is the 
wife's leisure,  is the labor supply of the husband, is the labor supply of the wife, X is total 
money income (or consumption with price equal to one),  is the husband's after-tax market 
wage,  is the wife's after-tax market wage, and Y is after-tax unearned income.  Although we 
refer to  and  as the "leisure" of the husband and wife, respectively, they actually 
correspond to all uses of non-market time, including home production activities.  In order to 
abstract from decision making on the extensive margin (that is, entry into and exit from the labor 
market), evaluation of the impact of the tax reform of 2001 will be undertaken for dual earner 
families only. 
2 2L T h= −
1h 2h
1w
2w
1L 2L
 The implications of limiting the analysis to dual earner families only will likely be most 
pronounced at the lower end of the income distribution.  Expansion of the EITC has been found 
                                                 
4 See McElroy (1990: 560) for a description of neoclassical and Nash-bargained models of 
household behavior.  Also see Hotchkiss, Kassis, and Moore (1997) and Friedberg and Webb 
(2006). 
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 to have a greater impact on labor force participation than on hours of work decisions (Eissa and 
Liebman 1995).5 
 The solution to the maximization problem in equation (1) can be expressed in terms of 
the indirect utility function, which is solely a function of the wages of the husband and wife and 
unearned income of the family: 
  (2) 
{
}
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                            ( , , ) ( , , )
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where and correspond to the optimal labor supply equations for the 
husband and wife, respectively.  In order to capture the total effect of the change in after-tax 
income resulting from the 2001 tax reform, the indirect utility function is totally differentiated: 
*
1 1 2( , , )h w w Y
*
2 1 2( , , )h w w Y
  (3) 1 1 2 2 3dV U dh U dh U dX= − − +
where  is the family's marginal utility of the husband's leisure,  is the family's marginal 
utility of the wife's leisure, and  is the family's marginal utility of consumption.  Equation (3) 
makes it clear that the change in welfare not only depends on the labor supply response, but also 
on the family's marginal evaluation of a change in leisure and income.  Theoretically, labor is 
supplied to the extent that the marginal utility of leisure is equal to the market wage, suggesting 
that, within a family, if husbands are paid more than wives, that .  In addition, lower 
estimates of the marginal utilities of leisure would be consistent with greater values of labor 
supply, ceteris paribus.  As the additional utility gained from an additional dollar of income 
increases at a decreasing rate, we would expect  to be smaller for higher income families.  It is 
1U 2U
3U
1U U> 2
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5 Noonan et al. (2005) also identify a strong impact of increasing EITC generosity on the labor 
force participation of single mothers.  Also see Eissa et al. (2004). 
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 because of these theoretically expected differences across family characteristics (namely, wages 
and preferences) that the utility function parameters will be estimated separately by family type. 
 Expressed in terms of changes in wages and unearned income, and re-arranging terms to 
illuminate the contribution of those changes to family welfare through their impact on husband's 
labor supply, wife's labor supply, and total family income, the total derivative in equation (3) 
becomes: 
 
1 1 1
1 1 2
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 The 2001 tax reform had the effect of changing workers' after-tax wages (  and ) 
and families' after-tax unearned incomes ( ).  The impact of these changes on family welfare 
can be calculated using simulated wage and income changes and estimated utility function 
parameters.  In order to determine the impact of the 2001 tax reform on family welfare, utility 
function parameters are estimated for the sample of families in 2000, given their net, after-tax 
wages and (virtual) unearned income in 2000.  We then calculate what each member's 2000 
after-tax wage and unearned income would be under the 2005 tax code.  The difference in these 
wages and income are then used to calculate the difference in welfare that the family experiences 
under the 2005 tax regime compared with the tax regime prior to the 2001 tax reform.  The 
1dw 2dw
dY
- 5 - 
 advantage of this simulation exercise (as opposed to merely calculating observed changes in 
hours pre- and post-tax regime change) is that everything except the tax regime is held constant.6   
 The complication of endogenous wages and income and appropriate vertical intercept for 
the budget constraint in estimation of labor supply in the presence of a progressive tax system is 
well-known (see Burtless and Hausman 1978).  As Ransom (1987) points out, neither fully 
incorporating endogenous wages nor instrumental variables techniques are practical solutions for 
the specification here, given the highly nonlinear way in which wages enter the labor supply 
functions.  Unearned income, however, will be adjusted as suggested by Hall (1973) to reflect 
"virtual" unearned income in order to fully linearize the budget constraint on which the family is 
optimizing.  The procedure amounts to subtracting after-tax earnings from after-tax total income 
to yield virtual unearned income.  As Ransom points out, the implication of not fully 
parameterizing the budget constraint is that the wage elasticities are likely to be downward 
biased and the income elasticities are likely to be biased upward. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Data 
 The direction (sign) of the change in utility at the optimal leisure choices that results from 
changes in the husband's and wife's after-tax wages, and family after-tax unearned income 
cannot always be determined analytically; it depends on the direction of the wage changes and 
the size of labor supply responses of the husband and wife to own and to spouse wage changes, 
as well as on the relative size of the additional utility the family attains from the leisure enjoyed 
by the husband and wife and from additional unearned income.   
 In order to obtain estimates of the pieces of the total derivative in equation (4) a family 
                                                 
6 Wages and income in 2000 are not inflated to 2005 values in order to keep the impact of tax 
regime changes from being confounded by the effects of inflation. 
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 labor supply model is estimated empirically, necessitating that a specific form of utility be 
assumed.   We estimate a quadratic form of the utility function: 
 ( ) ( ) (1 2) 'U Z Z Z Zα= − Β  (5) 
where Z is a vector with elements 1 1Z T h= − , 2 2Z T h= −  and 3 1 1 2 2Z w h w h Y= + + ; α  is a 
vector of parameters and  is a matrix of parameters.  This utility function belongs to the class 
of flexible functional forms in the sense that it can be thought of as a second order approximation 
to an arbitrary utility function when 
Β
Β  is positive definite.7   
 The outgoing rotation groups from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in March, April, 
May, and June 2000 were used to construct the sample for which the family labor supply model 
is estimated.  Detailed unearned income was obtained by matching each family to the March 
survey, which is the month in which this information is collected.8  Multiple months of outgoing 
rotation groups were used in order to expand the sample size.  Only respondents who reported 
hourly or weekly wages were included in the sample to ensure a more accurate 
reporting/construction of the hourly wage.  Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations 
of the variables for the sample. 
[Table 1 here] 
 The families are split into four categories based on the education of the husband in the 
family.  These group formations are highly correlated with total family income; separating 
families based on family income itself was not conducive to obtaining separate group-specific 
                                                 
7 The first order conditions, the labor supply equations, and the likelihood function estimated to 
obtain structural parameter estimates are found in Ransom (1987: 467-8) and also used in 
Hotchkiss and Moore (1997).  These are repeated in Appendix A for the convenience of the 
reader.  Appendix A also contains details on obtaining estimates for equation (4). 
8Since the CPS only allows for identification of unearned income in the previous year, it must be 
considered a proxy for current family unearned income. 
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 utility function parameters (the model was too unstable).9  The differences in means across 
family type are not surprising.  The representation of blacks is lowest among families with the 
highest education; the number of children is highest in the lowest education group and lowest 
among families with the highest income; hours of work, wages, and unearned income all increase 
with family education. 
 Information on the detailed sources of family income, number of children, and earnings 
available from the CPS is used to calculate the marginal tax rate on earnings (wages) and the 
total tax liability (in any year of interest) using the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) TAXSIM tax calculator (http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/, also see Feenberg and 
Coutts1993).  The calculator is more complete than we have information for from the CPS, so we 
made assumptions for the missing values as recommended by the managers of the tax calculator.  
For example, there is no information in the CPS that would allow one to calculate itemized 
deductions (mortgage payments, charitable contributions, etc.), so values of zero are entered for 
the missing information.  Although this means we don't have as accurate a calculation of the 
family's actual tax liability as we would like, it is important to remember that the assumptions for 
each family do not change across years of comparison.  
 The bottom rows of Table 1 present comparisons of the families' marginal tax rates, after-
tax total annual family incomes, after-tax wages, and after-tax weekly unearned incomes 
between 2000 and 2005.  These are calculated by evaluating the 2000 gross values under the tax 
regimes in 2000 and in 2005 (rather than confound the influence of inflation on tax liability, the 
actual 2000 dollar amounts are used to calculate tax rates in 2005).  The average marginal tax 
rate decreased among all family education types, with the greatest decline going to families with 
                                                 
9 Evidence of assortive mating suggests that one will find husbands and wives with similar skill 
and education levels in the same family (see Hernstein and Murray 1994). 
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 the highest education.  Husbands enjoyed a bigger gain in their after-tax wage than wives (which 
actually has implications for gender wage inequality which will not be explored here), and 
families with the highest education levels also experienced the largest absolute (and percentage) 
increase in hourly pay and unearned income.  This greatest (absolute and percentage) benefit of 
the 2001 tax reform going to the highest income groups has been the source of much controversy 
and criticism of the policy change.10 
 
V. Results and Policy Implications 
 Table 2 contains the maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the utility function 
parameters corresponding to equation (5).  The regressors that affect labor supply typically do so 
in expected ways.  Generally, the presence of children significantly decreases the labor supply of 
wives and increases (or doesn't affect) the labor supply of husbands.  The labor supply of wives 
who's husbands have at least a college degree is most sensitive to changes in the number of 
children in the family and to having a very young child.  In addition, college educated women 
typically work more hours than women with less than a college degree.  Black husbands tend to 
work fewer hours than their white counterparts, whereas black wives typically work more hours.  
Ceofficients for families in which the husband has less than a high school degree are very 
imprecisely estimated.   
[Table 2 here] 
 The parameter estimates in Table 2 are used to calculate marginal utilities of leisure and 
income, as well as labor supply and income elasticities; these are reported in Table 3.  The 
largest own (uncompensated) wage elasticities are found among both wives and husbands in 
                                                 
10 For example, see Hashemzadeh and Saubert (2004). 
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 families where the husband has a high school degree only.  The smaller own wage elasticity 
among husbands with at least some college is consistent with the labor supply elasticities found 
by Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) in their investigation of the effect of taxation on the labor supply 
decisions of affluent men.  Moffitt and Wilhelm speculate that this low labor supply response to 
wage changes could be because high income men are already working a lot of hours and have 
little or no room left to respond to wage changes.  The very small response of men with less than 
a high school degree may be a function of an absence of opportunity or motivation consistent 
with their low education levels.  Among all families, wives are estimated to have similar or 
smaller responses to own-wage changes than their husbands.  This is not what we would 
typically expect; the result could be a function of the joint estimation of labor supply, the 
restriction of the analysis to dual-earner families, or the time period in which the elasticities are 
estimated.11   
[Table 3 here] 
 Across education groups, wives are more responsive to changes in their husband's wages, 
than husbands are to changes in their wife's wages.  In addition, husbands are more responsive to 
changes in their own wage than to changes in their wife's wage.  Wives, on the other hand are 
generally more responsive to changes in their husband's wage than to changes in their own wage.  
These estimates are consistent with a the traditional view of the husband being the primary wage 
earner.  Both husbands and wives have the expected low, negative income elasticity.  The 
estimated positive cross-wage elasticities indicate that husbands and wives view their leisure 
time as complimentary. 
                                                 
11 Ransom (1987) estimated own wage elasticities of 0.70 for married women and -0.04 for 
married men  in 1976; Hotchkiss and Moore (1997) estimated own wage elasticities of 0.12 
(0.07) for married women (men) in 1995; and Blau and Kahn (2005) estimated own wage 
elasticities for married women of about 0.83 in 1980, 0.61 in 1990 and 0.39 in 2000. 
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  The differences in estimated wage elasticities across groups indicate that behavior does 
differ across family characteristics.  To be fair, each of the group estimates, except those of high 
school only families, fall within the boot-strapped 95 percent confidence intervals of the full 
sample results, but the expectation is that larger sample sizes would make these estimates more 
precise and statistically different from one another.  The implication of parameter estimates that 
differ across family characteristics is that any analysis of tax (or other) policy on the welfare of 
families should take into account how families will respond differently to incentives and 
constraints.  The lower marginal utilities of leisure and income among high education families 
will further exacerbate the difference in behavior in the evaluation of differences in the welfare 
effect.  The lower additional utility that high education families receive from additional units of 
leisure is consistent with a preference structure that would lead to family members working long 
hours.  In addition, given a higher level of income to start with, an additional dollar of income 
does not yield as much utility to high education families. 
 In the middle of Table 3 are the simulated impacts on family welfare of the 2001 tax 
reform, accounting for the labor supply response that would be expected, given the change in 
marginal tax rates.  The representative low education family is expected to have reduced its 
supply of labor to the market.  Although the higher net wage would have provided the incentive 
to work more hours (indicated by the positive own wage elasticity), the relatively large expected 
increase in unearned income, and resulting incentive to decrease labor supply, overpowered the 
expected impact of the higher net wage.12  In contrast, the consumption of families in which the 
husband had a high school degree received a significant income boost from the strong positive 
                                                 
12 All utility function parameters and simulations are performed for the representative family 
within each income group.  The calculations are highly non-linear, thus one has to be careful to 
keep all characteristics (except the policy parameters in question) the same when simulating 
different policy changes. 
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 labor supply response to the wage changes.  In spite of the apparent much larger welfare gain 
among high school families, the marginal utility of income is also much higher among high 
school families, making the dollar-equivalent value of the utility gain (in brackets) less than what 
is experienced by families with some college and beyond.  
 
 A. Distribution of Welfare Gains across Educational Groups 
 Figure 1 plots the average pre-tax annual income along with the dollar equivalent welfare 
gain accruing to the representative family in each husband education group.  The higher 
education groups (also the higher income groups) reap higher dollar equivalent welfare gains.  
This positive relationship between family income and welfare gain is exactly what has drawn a 
fair amount of criticism of the 2001 tax reform (Kamin and Shapiro 2004).  However, the tax 
reform supporters counter than this relationship is perfectly appropriate given that the higher 
income families pay a higher proportion of the total tax bill (Bartlett 2005).  
[Figure 1] 
 The share of the welfare gain accruing to higher education families can be seen by 
dividing the proportion of the total welfare gain accruing to each education group by the 
education group's population share.  These values are plotted in Figure 2.  A value less than one 
means that the group is receiving less than it's population share of the additional welfare gain; a 
value greater than one means the group is getting more than it's population share.13  The figure 
                                                 
13 The group's share of the welfare gain relative to it's population share is calculated as: 
ii i i
i
i i i i i
NN dV N dV
N dV N N dV
÷ = ∑∑ ∑ ∑ , where  is the number of families in education group i, and 
 is the welfare gain of the representative family in education group i.  This transformation 
shows that the group's share relative to it's population share (plotted in Figure 2) is merely a 
scaled version of the welfare gain plotted in Figure 1 ( ). 
iN
idV
idV
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 indicates that the college family group is getting more than it's population share of the total 
welfare gain from the 2001 tax reform, whereas all the other education groups are getting less 
than their population shares.   
[Figure 2 here] 
 Figure 2 also plots the representative family's welfare gain as a percent of its pre-tax 
family income.  As a share of income, the welfare gain actually declines slightly with education.  
So, depending on whether the distributional policy goal is more heavily weighted to equity or 
efficiency preferences, the 2001 tax reform could be considered to have had a disproportionate 
impact across income groups with the largest benefits accruing to the highest income families 
(evaluated with more emphasis on equity preference); or, the benefits of the 2001 tax reform 
could be seen as generating a proportionally equal welfare gain across families of different 
income levels (evaluated with more of a balance of equity and efficiency preference).14 
 One of the expectations of the 2001 tax reform is that lower marginal tax rates would 
motivate people to work more.  In Table 3 we saw that labor supply was expected to have 
increased in each representative family, except those in which the husband has less than a high 
school degree.  Toward the bottom of Table 3 the share of total welfare gain accruing to each 
education group is reported, along with each group's share of the total increase in labor supply.  
A striking disparity appears in comparing the share of welfare gain and share of additional labor 
supplied by college families.  College families are expected to have enjoyed about 43 percent of 
the total tax reform welfare gain, yet only to have supplied 17 percent of the additional labor 
supply generated by the reform.  This result has potential implications for the expected economic 
growth to be generated from such a tax policy change.  If worker productivity is heterogeneous 
                                                 
14 See Moore (1996) for a fuller discussion of equity versus efficiency preference in 
distributional policy goals. 
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 across education, with more value-added output being generated by college graduates than high 
school graduates per hour of input, then a policy that induced higher-educated workers to supply 
a greater proportion of the additional labor supply would generate greater output.  Of course the 
cost of such incentives would have to be considered. 
 
 B. Welfare Gain and Number of Children 
 One of the most popular features of the 2001 tax reform was the expansion of the child 
tax credit.  The per-child credit was scheduled to increase gradually from $500 to $1000 by the 
year 2010.  The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 advanced families the 
$1000 credit per child for 2003 and 2004 then was supposed to revert back to the original phase-
in.  Then, the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 extended the $1000 credit per child for 
each year until 2010.   This is an additional fixed dollar amount accruing to families with 
children.  However, the credit is limited for families with income over certain thresholds.  
Because of this special tax treatment of children, it is of interest to determine how the tax policy 
change is expected to have affected families with different numbers of children.15  Of course, 
number of children is only one characteristic of a family that figures into determining tax 
liability. 
 The same methodology to estimate welfare gains across families of different educational 
categories was used to obtain parameter estimates for family groups differentiated by the number 
of children: no children, one child, two children, three or more children.  All of the results and 
                                                 
15 The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit was also increased over this time period, but since 
the CPS does not report child care expenditures, the specific impact of that provision can not be 
incorporated into the present analysis.  Since this tax credit is underutilized by low-income 
families (Forry and Anderson 2006), its omission is expected to mostly influence the welfare 
estimates among higher income families. 
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 sample means are found in Appendix B.  As one might expect, families with no children  are 
older, more educated, and have the highest family income.  Husbands in childless families work 
less and wives in childless families work more on average than families with children.  In the 
families with three or more children, wives work the least number of hours on average, husbands 
work about the same, but average family income is significantly lower than among other family 
types.   
 Figures 3 and 4 repeat the graphical depiction of results depicted in Figures 1 and 2, but 
for families differentiated by number of children.  Figure 3 shows that the added benefit of 
having more children (through the child tax credit) can overcome the lower reduction in marginal 
tax rates (as a result of earning lower wages).  The dollar equivalent utility gain is higher for 
families with more children.  Figure 4 shows that all groups except those without children are 
expected to have gotten more than their population share of the tax reform welfare gain.  And, 
since average income is lower among the families with more children, the welfare gain as a 
percent of pre-tax family income is also greater for larger families. 
[Figures 3 and 4 here] 
 
 C. Caveats 
 While the relative welfare impacts presented in this paper are valid within the scope of 
the assumptions made, it's important to keep in mind the potential implications of those 
assumptions.  First of all, the results are generalizable only to families in which both husband 
and wife are working; labor supply responses are allowed only along the intensive margin.  This 
is likely to have the greatest impact on the welfare assessment of lower income families since the 
increases in the generosity of the EITC is the feature of the 2001 tax reform likely to have the 
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 greatest impact on labor force participation decisions (for example, see Eissa and Liebman 1995 
and Noonan et al. 2005).  The implication is that the welfare estimates presented in this paper for 
dual-earner lower income families likely underestimate the welfare impact for the population of 
low-income families (see Eissa et al. 2004). 
 In addition, Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) estimate the welfare cost of the Economic 
Recover Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as measured by their impact on 
consumption stability.  They estimate that these two tax reforms enhanced consumption stability 
among low-income households, but generated substantial welfare costs for most middle- and 
upper-income families as a result of a reduction in their consumption stability by 50 percent.  
The implication for the welfare change estimates presented in this paper is that the estimates for 
low-income families are likely lower and those for higher income families higher than would 
result if the model accounted for risk-aversion and changes in consumption stability. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 The purpose of this paper was to assess the impact of the 2001 tax reform on family 
welfare and to investigate how that impact could have varied across family characteristics.  In 
particular, separate family utility function parameters were estimated for groups of families 
differentiated by the education of the husband and by number of children in the family.  The 
analysis provided estimates of income elasticities of labor supply, marginal utilities of leisure 
and unearned income, as well as the overall welfare impact of the marginal tax rate and other tax 
policy changes resulting from implementation of the 2001 tax reform.   
 The analysis found that the dollar equivalent welfare gain of the tax reform increased 
with the education of the husband, which is highly correlated with total family income.  
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 However, the welfare gain as a percent of total income was essentially distributed equally across 
family education groups.  In addition, while 43 percent of the total welfare gain from the 2001 
tax reform was expected to accrue to the high education families, those families were only 
expected to supply 17 percent of the additional total labor supply.  If more highly educated 
individuals are also more productive, this sort of marginal tax rate reduction may not be an 
efficient way to increase supply-generated economic growth.  However, since high education 
people are already working long hours, any incentives to generate a larger labor supply response 
from this more productive group could prove to be too costly. 
 An additional example illustrated that merely having the highest income did not 
necessarily mean that a family type would reap the greatest gain from the 2001 tax reform.  By 
estimating separate utility function parameters across families with different numbers of 
children, it was found that while families with no children had the highest income on average, 
they were the only family type differentiated by number of children that received less than their 
population share of tax reform welfare gain.  The per-child tax credit made up for the lower 
marginal tax rate cut experienced by lower-earning families with children.  In all, the results in 
this paper illustrate that understanding the behavioral response to a policy change and 
understanding that behavior varies across family characteristics is important in a thorough 
assessment of the welfare impact of that policy change. 
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 Figure 1. Pre-tax family income and dollar equivalent utility gain by husband education group. 
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Figure 2. Welfare gain as percent of pre-tax family income and each education group's share of 
total welfare gain relative to the group's population share. 
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 Figure 3. Pre-tax family income and dollar equivalent utility gain by number of children group. 
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Figure 4. Welfare gain as percent of pre-tax family income and each family size group's share of 
total welfare gain relative to the group's population share. 
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 Table 1. Sample means by family education type, families in 2000. 
 
Family Type: 
 
 
Full Sample 
Husband Less 
Than High 
School 
 
Husband High 
School 
 
Husband Some 
College 
Husband 
College or 
More 
Age1 
42.913 
(10.386) 
42.977 
(11.909) 
42.534 
(10.431) 
42.558 
(10.224) 
43.607 
(9.999) 
Age2 40.828 40.645 40.537 40.365 41.548 
Black1 = 1 0.075 0.086 0.080 0.087 0.057 
Black2 = 1 0.072 0.084 0.077 0.081 0.055 
White1 = 1 0.880 0.856 0.888 0.873 0.885 
White2 = 1 0.880 0.853 0.890 0.876 0.881 
Other Race1 = 1 0.045 0.058 0.032 0.041 0.058 
Other Race2 = 1 0.048 0.063 0.033 0.043 0.065 
LESSHS1 = 1 0.083 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LESSHS2 = 1 0.062 0.415 0.059 0.026 0.005 
HS1 = 1 0.318 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
HS2 = 1 0.326 0.383 0.556 0.282 0.117 
SOMECOLL1 = 1 0.284 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
SOMECOLL2 = 1 0.299 0.154 0.262 0.471 0.219 
COLL1 = 1 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
COLL2 = 1 0.313 0.048 0.122 0.220 0.659 
NKIDS 1.008 (1.111) 
1.210 
(1.293) 
1.019 
(1.105) 
1.204 
(1.117) 
0.929 
(1.050) 
PRESCHL = 1 0.231 0.298 0.232 0.225 0.218 
Husband's weekly hours 43.094 (8.741) 
40.826 
(7.525) 
42.196 
(7.882) 
42.799 
(8.738) 
44.861 
(9.527) 
Wife's weekly hours 36.839 (10.076) 
36.581 
(8.273) 
36.867 
(9.201) 
36.313 
(10.017) 
37.352 
(11.307) 
Husband's pre-tax wage 18.56 (11.24) 
11.40 
(5.23) 
15.41 
(7.20) 
17.26 
(9.11) 
24.90 
(14.17) 
Wife's pre-tax wage 14.11 (9.30) 
9.42 
(5.02) 
12.05 
(6.78) 
13.21 
(7.51) 
18.21 
(11.94) 
Family's pre-tax weekly 
non-labor income  
107.48 
(267.74) 
44.00 
(128.47) 
69.37 
(172.41) 
99.59 
(232.08) 
169.64 
(371.62) 
Total annual pre-tax 
income ($) 
72,206 
(39,700) 
[3,440-553,879] 
43,229 
(19,719) 
[10,760-190,701] 
58,629 
(24,934) 
[10,300-231,602] 
66,575 
(30,776) 
[3,440-325,461] 
98,557 
(47,821) 
[12,982-553,879] 
Total annual after tax 
income ($) 
47,456 
(18,253) 
34,258 
(10,942) 
41,803 
(12,573) 
45,720 
(15,108)        
58,180 
(21,552) 
Change in marginal tax rate 
on wagesa (%age points) 
-3.890 
(6.806) 
-2.545 
(9.380) 
-3.427 
(7.220) 
-4.055 
(6.951) 
-4.589 
(5.158) 
dW1b ($ per hour) 0.804 
(1.171) 
0.300 
(0.979) 
0.648 
(1.139) 
0.810 
(1.195) 
1.087 
(1.153) 
dW2b ($ per hour) 0.617 
(0.947) 
0.271 
(0.848) 
0.505 
(0.912) 
0.616 
(0.945) 
0.820 
(0.963) 
dYb ($ per week) 71.937 
(86.893) 
64.945 
(69.209) 
56.888 
(76.164) 
61.336 
(81.681) 
98.467 
(98.937) 
Number of Observations 9,393 778 2,988  2,663 2,964 
- 23 - 
 Notes: The "1" subscript corresponds to the husband's values of the variable and the "2" subscript 
corresponds to the wife. 
a Includes state and federal taxes; average change between 2000 and 2005. 
b These correspond to how after-tax wages, virtual non-labor income, and total annual family 
income and  would be different in 2005 compared with 2000, changing only the tax regime under 
which the wages and income are received.
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Table 2.  Maximum likelihood parameter estimates and utility function parameters, families in 
2000. 
 
 Full 
Sample 
Husband 
Less Than 
High 
School 
Husband 
High 
School 
Husband 
Some 
College 
Husband 
College 
and 
Greater 
Elements of α1*      
   Intercept 41.159*** 
(1.442) 
-5.928 
(13.427) 
24.809***    
(2.595) 
37.655***    
(3.126) 
36.230***    
(3.539) 
   Black1 = 1 -1.511*** 
(.438) 
.017 
(1.841) 
-1.387*      
(.726) 
-2.726***    
(.919) 
-2.444***    
(.890) 
   COLL1 = 1 3.485*** 
(.220) 
-- -- -- -- 
   AGE1 -.067*** 
(.009) 
-.023 
(.022) 
-.044***    
(.017) 
-.040**      
(.020) 
-.027     
(.018) 
   NKIDS .543*** 
(.105) 
.604 
(.394) 
1.022***  
(.209) 
.914***   
(.210) 
.911***    
(.229) 
   PRESCHL = 1 -0.850*** 
(.284) 
-1.626 
(1.148) 
.598       
(.511) 
-1.190**      
(.578) 
-.171      
(.593) 
Elements of α2*      
   Intercept 22.884*** 
(2.282) 
44.831* 
(24.318) 
8.745**      
(3.709) 
7.246**      
(3.663) 
22.769***    
(6.165) 
   Black2 = 1 1.549*** 
(.377) 
-.483 
(3.00) 
2.247***    
(.743) 
1.536***    
(.479) 
2.240**      
(1.085) 
   COLL2 = 1 1.797*** 
(.245) 
2.713 
(2.615) 
1.410***    
(.410) 
1.132***    
(.292) 
2.979***    
(.688) 
   AGE2 -.030*** 
(.009) 
-.007 
(.046) 
-.022     
(.017) 
.005      
(.011) 
-.006      
(.022) 
   NKIDS -.714*** 
(.100) 
-.712 
(.765) 
-.829***    
(.195) 
-.639***    
(.129) 
-1.374***    
(.308) 
   PRESCHL = 1 -1.569*** 
(.243) 
2.509 
(2.270) 
-1.903***    
(.497) 
-.700**      
(.312) 
-2.722***    
(0.727) 
α3* .431*** 
(.019) 
0.325 
(.249) 
.916***    
(.110) 
.467***    
(.042) 
.393***    
(.052) 
β11 -- -- -- -- -- 
β22 .685*** 
(.062) 
2.643*** 
(.804) 
.842***    
(.108) 
.482***    
(.062) 
.877***    
(.161) 
β33 .00021*** 
(.00001) 
-.00018 
(.00014) 
.00021***  
(.00004) 
.00010***  
(.00002) 
.00025***  
(.00003) 
β12 -.084*** 
(.030) 
-1.324*** 
(.335) 
-.544***    
(.054) 
-.241 ***   
(.066) 
-.212***    
(.079) 
β13 -.0013*** 
(.0002) 
-.0034 
(.0026) 
-.0070***  
(.0008) 
-.0044***  
(.0006) 
.00005   
(.0004) 
β23 -.0009*** 
(.0003) 
-.0044 
(.0041) 
-.0023***  
(.0007) 
-.0012**  
(.0006) 
-.0003 
(.0004) 
1/σ1 .110*** 
(.001) 
.084*** 
(.016) 
.104***    
(.002) 
.104***    
(.001) 
.100***    
(.001) 
- 25 - 
 1/σ2 .142*** 
(.013) 
.044*** 
(.013) 
.117***    
(.014) 
.194***    
(.025) 
.101***    
(.019) 
ρ -.011 
(.069) 
-.966*** 
(.062) 
-.720***    
(.067) 
-.431**     
(.173) 
-.236     
(.159) 
Log-likelihood 
function 
-33515.5 -2521.87 -9971.89 -9489.19 -11115.7 
Number of 
Observations 
9,393 778 2,988 2,663 2,964 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 
percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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 Table 3. Estimated utility function parameters and labor supply elasticities and simulated change 
in family welfare resulting from the 2001 tax reform, by education of husband, families in 2000. 
 
 
Full 
Sample 
Husband 
Less Than 
HS 
Husband 
High 
School 
Husband 
Some 
College 
Husband 
at least 
College 
U1 1.59^ 1.39^ 3.96^ 1.72^ 1.14 
U2 1.23^ 1.13^ 3.08 1.31 .89^ 
U3 .14^ .15^ .36^ .14^ .10^ 
Husband's own wage elasticity  .20^ .16^ .41^ .25^ .26^ 
Husband's cross wage elasticity .15^ .06^ .25^ .19^ .17^ 
Husband's unearned income elasticity  -.010 -.008^ -.019^ -.014^ -.017 
Wife's own wage elasticity .19^ .07 .33^ .25^ .19^ 
Wife's cross wage elasticity .15^ .14^ .37^ .21^ .22^ 
Wife's unearned income elasticity  -.013^ -.006^ -.019^ -.017^ -.020 
      
Husband's labor supply response (hrs/wk) .64^ -.17^ .93^ .86^ .83^ 
Wife's labor supply response (hrs/wk) .45^ -.03^ .88^ .69^ .58^ 
      
dV (Total change in utility) 
[annual dollar-equivalent = (dV/U3)*52] 
19.03^ 
[$6,829] 
12.93^ 
[$4,535] 
37.34^ 
[$5,381] 
17.24^ 
[$6,194] 
17.61^ 
[$9,548] 
   dVH1 (from change in husband's hrs) -1.02^ .24^ -3.69^ -1.47^ -.95 
   dVH2 (from change in wife's hours) -.56^ .03^ -2.72^ -.91^ -.52 
   dVX (from change in income) 20.61^ 12.66^ 43.74^ 19.62^ 19.07^ 
      
Welfare gain as percent of total pre-tax 
family income 
10.86% 11.33% 10.43% 10.95% 10.54% 
Percent of total (dollar-equivalent) utility 
generated from the 2001 tax reform 
accruing to each family type 
100% 5.27% 25.28% 26.86% 42.59% 
Percent of total labor supply response 
provided by family type 
100% -0.65% 22.56% 17.17% 17.45% 
Number of observations 9,393 778 2,988 2,663 2,964 
Note: Estimates obtained for representative family in each group. ^ indicates estimate of utility 
function parameter is significantly different from zero based on bootstrapped 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  Unearned income elasticities are evaluated at actual unearned income. 
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 Appendix A:  First order conditions of utility maximization problem, labor supply equations, 
and likelihood function estimated. 
 
 As presented by Ransom (1987), the first order conditions set equal to zero that result 
from maximizing the utility function in equation (5) in the text are: 
( ) ( ) 212322111321222111331111*3*11 2 hwYhwhwhYhwhwwhwm βββββαα ++++−++−−+=  
 (A1) 
( ) ( ) 122322112311222112332222*3*22 2 hwYhwhwhYhwhwwhwm βββββαα ++++−++−−+=  
 (A2) 
There is no need to specify a time endowment in order to estimate the labor supply functions 
because , , and  are re-parameterized functions of *1α *2α *3α sT α, , and sβ .  This re-
parameterization is necessary for identification of the labor supply equations.  It is through these 
starred parameters that differences in tastes across families are allowed to enter.  Specifically, 
111
*
1 εα +ΓΧ= , (A3) 
and 
222
*
2 εα +ΓΧ= , (A4) 
where  and  are vectors of individual and family characteristics, 1Χ 2Χ 1Γ  and  are parameters 
to be estimated, and 
2Γ
1ε  and 2ε  are normally distributed error terms with means zero and 
covariance matrix Σ . 
 The likelihood function estimated, for a sample in which both husbands and wives are 
working, is 
( ) ( )1 2,L abs J f ε ε=Π  , (A5) 
where, 
( ) ( ) 212322111321222111331111*3111 2 hwYhwhwhYhwhwwhw βββββαε ++++−++−−+ΓΧ= , 
 (A6) 
- A1 - 
 and 
( ) ( ) 121322112311222112332222*3222 2 hwYhwhwhYhwhwwhw βββββαε ++++−++−−+ΓΧ= , 
 (A7) 
and the Jacobian, , has the form: J
( )( ) ( )22 211 33 1 13 1 22 33 2 23 2 33 1 2 12 13 2 23 12 2J w w w w w w wβ β β β β β β β β β= − − + − − + − − − + + w . 
 (A8)  
The Jacobian is restricted to be positive for internal consistency to ensure that a unique solution 
exists.  Further details can be found in Ransom (1987: 467-8). 
 In order to obtain estimates for  (equation 4 in text), we require expressions for the 
partial derivatives of the labor supply equations (  and ) with respect to , , and Y .  
This is accomplished by setting equations A1 and A2 equal to zero and solving the equations 
simultaneously for explicit expressions for  and , respectively.  These explicit functions are 
then differentiated accordingly.  These manipulations were performed with the help of 
Mathematica® (Wolfram Research, version 2.2) for the Macintosh.  The derivatives are then 
evaluated at the sample means and the estimated coefficient. 
dV
1h 2h 1w 2w
1h 2h
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 Appendix B:  Sample details and results for families by number of children categories, families 
in 2000. 
 
Table B1. Sample means by number of children, families in 2000. 
 
Family Type: No Children One Child Two Children 
Three or More 
Children 
Age1 
46.888 
(11.634) 
40.510 
(9.090) 
39.240 
(7.075) 
38.928 
(6.606) 
Age2 
44.890 
(11.318) 
38.474 
(8.586) 
37.060 
(6.518) 
36.554 
(5.518) 
Black1 = 1 0.065 0.091 0.067 0.106 
Black2 = 1 0.063 0.088 0.062 0.096 
White1 = 1 0.897 0.860 0.888 0.829 
White2 = 1 0.896 0.859 0.888 0.836 
Other Race1 = 1 0.038 0.048 0.045 0.065 
Other Race2 = 1 0.041 0.053 0.050 0.068 
LESSHS1 = 1 0.075 0.080 0.078 0.136 
LESSHS2 = 1 0.055 0.060 0.055 0.120 
HS1 = 1 0.313 0.318 0.333 0.308 
HS2 = 1 0.336 0.329 0.307 0.315 
SOMECOLL1 = 1 0.278 0.296 0.272 0.309 
SOMECOLL2 = 1 0.290 0.295 0.313 0.316 
COLL1 = 1 0.334 0.307 0.317 0.247 
COLL2 = 1 0.320 0.316 0.325 0.249 
NKIDS 0.000 1.000 2.000 3.308 
PRESCHL = 1 0.021 0.352 0.408 0.497 
Husband's weekly hours 42.572 (9.351) 
43.268 
(8.115) 
43.856 
(8.272) 
43.277 
(8.159) 
Wife's weekly hours 38.338 (9.485) 
36.665 
(9.128) 
35.291 
(10.961) 
34.026 
(11.356) 
Husband's pre-tax wage 18.762      (12.051) 
18.361     
(10.922) 
19.141      
(10.519) 
17.056  
(9.412) 
Wife's pre-tax wage 14.164       (9.456) 
14.373       
(9.904) 
14.327       
(8.786) 
12.692       
(8.099) 
Family's pre-tax weekly non-
labor income 
134.115     
(297.388) 
84.815    
(242.283) 
89.226    
(240.508) 
80.768     
(227.637) 
Total annual pre-tax income ($) 74,826 
(40,660) 
[10,300-
346,346] 
70,553 
(39,793) 
[3,440-553,879] 
72,453 
(38,125)  
[14,375-
302,682] 
63,319   
(37,209) 
[10,760-
301,861] 
Total annul after tax income 46,497   
(18,932) 
46,451 
(17,759) 
49,852   
(17,507) 
48,479 
(17,356) 
Change in marginal tax rate on 
wagesa (%age points) 
-4.720       
(5.069) 
-3.677       
(6.360) 
-2.865       
(8.015) 
-3.098      
(10.306) 
dW1b ($ per hour) 0.917       
(1.049) 
0.796 
(1.154) 
0.690       
(1.281) 
0.571 
 (1.389) 
dW2b ($ per hour) 0.700 
 (0.840) 
0.622       
(0.971) 
0.520       
(1.013) 
0.451       
(1.131) 
- B1 - 
 dYb ($ per week) 49.551      
(79.350) 
70.008      
(80.959) 
99.413      
(88.594) 
114.019    
(95.222) 
Number of Observations 4,197 2,110 2,180 906 
Notes: The "1" subscript corresponds to the husband's values of the variable and the "2" subscript 
corresponds to the wife. 
a Includes state and federal taxes; average change between 2000 and 2005. 
b These correspond to how after-tax wages, virtual non-labor income, and total annual family 
income and  would be different in 2005 compared with 2000, changing only the tax regime under 
which the wages and income are received. 
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Table B2.  Maximum likelihood parameter estimates and utility function parameters, by number 
of children, families in 2000. 
 
No 
Children 
One 
Child 
Two 
Children 
Three or 
More 
Children 
Elements of α1*     
   Intercept 34.696***   (2.196) 
45.857***   
(3.972) 
41.645**    
(2.078) 
43.314***   
(2.904) 
   Black1 = 1 
-1.240*     
(.696) 
-1.044     
(.913) 
-1.538  
(1.177) 
-2.040**    
(.997) 
   COLL1 = 1 
3.008***    
(.359) 
2.663***    
(.453) 
4.188***    
(.511) 
4.2646***   
(.751) 
   AGE1  
-.074***   
(.012) 
.025 
(.022) 
.040       
(.030) 
.077 
(.054) 
   NKIDS -- -- -- -- 
   PRESCHL = 1 -- -- -- -- 
Elements of α2*     
   Intercept  16.265***   (2.684) 
42.323***   
(13.651) 
7.334***    
(2.731) 
9.989**     
(5.025) 
   Black2 = 1 
.469 
(.422) 
3.312*      
(1.821) 
1.021*     
(.523) 
1.633*      
(.888) 
   COLL2 = 1 
1.918***    
(.344) 
3.064***    
(.976) 
.338 
(.252) 
.326 
(.364) 
   AGE2 
-.030***   
(.010) 
.075** 
(.035) 
.058***    
(.020) 
.053 
(.034) 
   NKIDS -- -- -- -- 
   PRESCHL = 1 -- -- -- -- 
α3* 
.397***    
(.022) 
.243***    
(.054) 
.664***    
(.078) 
.453***    
(.126) 
β11     
β22 
.703***    
.074 
1.129***    
(.366) 
.363*** 
(.070) 
.311**     
(.124) 
β33 
.000*** 
(.000) 
.000*** 
(.000) 
.000*** 
(.000) 
-.000* 
(.000) 
β12 
-.219***   
(.049) 
.082 
(.110) 
-.103**    
(.041) 
-.029      
(.061) 
β13 
.000 
(.000) 
-.001*** 
(.001) 
-.007*** 
(.001) 
-.007***     
(.002) 
β23 
.001** 
(.000) 
.002* 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.004***     
(.004) 
1/σ1 
.107*** 
(.001) 
.117*** 
(.003) 
.106*** 
(.001) 
.110***     
(0.003) 
1/σ2 
.152***    
(.016) 
(.094)***    
(.030) 
.220***   
(.043) 
.244***     
(.095) 
ρ -.300***   (.104) 
.242 
(.198) 
.0146       
(.129) 
.177       
(.204) 
Log-likelihood function -14918.3 -7247.30 -7812.55 -3278.44 
Number of Observations 4,197 2,110 2,180 906 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 
percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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 Table B3. Estimated utility function parameters and simulated change in hours, family income, 
and utility resulting from effects of 2001 tax reform, by number of children, families in 2000. 
 
 
 
No 
Children 
 
 
One Child
 
Two 
Children 
Three 
Children 
or More 
U1 1.89^ -0.05 2.39^ 1.63 
U2 1.51 -0.05 1.75^ 1.14^ 
U3 0.18^ 0.01 0.18^ 0.12^ 
Husband's own wage elasticity  0.20^ 0.10 0.34^ 0.20^ 
Husband's cross wage elasticity 0.12^ 0.07 0.34^ 0.26^ 
Husband's unearned income elasticity  -0.013^ -0.005^ -0.013^ -0.008^ 
Wife's own wage elasticity 0.18^ 0.07 0.42^ 0.31 
Wife's cross wage elasticity 0.16^ 0.10^ 0.23^ 0.09 
Wife's unearned income elasticity  -0.014^ -0.005^ -0.022^ -0.018^ 
     
Husband's labor supply response (hrs/wk) +0.77^ +0.27 +0.89^ +0.45^ 
Wife's labor supply response (hrs/wk) +0.70^ +0.23^ +0.30^ -0.21 
     
dV (Total change in utility) 
[annual dollar-equivalent = (dV/U3)*52] 
20.96^ 
[6,152] 
1.34 
[7,049] 
27.12^ 
[7,726] 
17.82 
[7.982] 
   dVH1 (from change in husband's hrs) -1.46^ 0.01 -2.12^ -0.74 
   dVH2 (from change in wife's hours) -1.06^ 0.01 -0.53^ 0.24 
   dVX (from change in income) 23.48^ 1.31 29.77^ 18.32^ 
     
Welfare gain as percent of total pre-tax 
family income 
8.22% 9.99% 10.66% 12.61% 
Percent of total (dollar-equivalent) utility 
generated from the 2001 tax reform 
accruing to each family type 
39.87% 22.96% 26.00% 11.17% 
Percent of total labor supply response 
provided by family type 
61.52% 10.47% 25.84% 2.17% 
Number of observations 4,197 2,110 2,180 906 
Note: Estimates obtained for representative family in each group.  ^ indicates estimate of utility 
function parameter is significantly different from zero based on bootstrapped 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  Unearned income elasticities are evaluated at actual unearned income. 
 
- B4 - 
